While Roman Republic was dealing with the last remnants of its great enemies; Macedonia and Carthage in the Third Punic and Fourth Macedonian Wars, a new power was rising in the east.

A Narrative by Rayber and Deniz

Mithradates I (Mihrdat) the Great was laying the foundations of the future Parthian Empire. He first invaded the Greco-Bactrian Kingdom (ca.163-155 BC) (Olbrycht 2010, p. 237) and seized great chunks of its lands into his empire. According to Strabo and Iustinus the mighty Greek Kingdom of Bactria lost against Parthians, then vassalized (Olbrycht 2010, p. 236-237), though its king Eucradites I had succeeded his wars of conquest in India after this conflict. Having secured his eastern borders, the great king was turning his gaze upon the west, the inevitable conflict with the troubled Seleucid Empire.

In 148-147 BC Mithradates conquered Media from the Seleucid Empire. After 141 BC he took Seleucia-on-the-Tigris and established Parthian reign over Babylonia. A year after, the Seleucid king Demetrius’ attempted to reconquer the lost territories, which resulted in a heavy failure, and he was taken prisoner (Brosius 2006, p.86; Curtis 2007, p. 11). Now the Parthian Empire was ruling over whole of Iran and Southern Mesopotamia. This trend reached its natural boundaries when under Mithradates II the empire extended into Caucasus, Armenia and Syria. Contact with Romans was established after him. There were some back and forth in the Roman-Parthian relations starting from the early decades of 1st century BC; until the Battle of Carrhae (53 BC). Agressive and active Roman policy throughout Third and Fourth Mithridatic Wars, seems soured the relations between the two powers. Romans tried to bully their counterpart and constantly acted against agreements of neutrality. Still, there was no direct confrontation between the two powers until Crassus’ adventurous action.

Before the damned campaign of Crassus, there were several hostile attempts by Romans against Parthia. During Pompey’s eastern campaigns, there were hostilities between him and Phraates III. Pompey made the Armenian Kingdom a Roman vassal and acted against Parthian interests. In spite of the quarrel between Tigranes the Great and Phraates III, he favored the former and gave him Roman protection. Furthermore he refused the proposal of Phraates about making Euphrates as a fixed border (Bivar 1983, p. 47). He responded against Phraates’ reconquest of Adiabene and Gordyene in 65 BC by sending his legates against him. According to Plutarch the Parthian king was chased by Afranius as far down as Arbela in northern Mesopotamia (Pompey, 36, 2), on the other hand Dio Cassius claims Afranius took back Gordyene without a fight (Dio Cassius, XXXVII, 5). Though Plutarch says that Afranius’ force drove Parthian king out of Gordyene, he didn’t make mentions about a battle or battles between two sides. The next year Phraates III invaded Armenia once more and this resulted with a new agreement between the three men. According to this, Mesopotamia and Adiabene were confirmed as Parthian territory while Gordyene stood as a part of Armenia (Shayegan 2011 p. 324-326).

Nonetheless, Roman ambitions had no ending. There was another legate of Pompey, Aulus Gabinius –who invaded east of Euphrates during Afranius’ campaign – who became pro-consul of Syria in 57 BC. As an ambitious man he was, he was looking for a reason to invade Parthia, for which he would find his excuse soon. That same year Mithridates IV and Orodes II killed their father Phraates III and took the throne, however they easily fell out, and Mithridates soon had to flee to the Roman side. He took refuge in Syria and searched support from Gabinius. He was eager to help him, thus prepared a force and marched towards enemy territory, but at the last moment his attention was diverted by another request. Another exiled king, Ptolemy XII Auletes came with a letter from Pompey and asked for his help to regain his throne in Egypt (Sheldon 2010, p. 19). Gabinius answered positively and left Mithridates alone. Thus, a possible threat by a capable Roman commander was eliminated; it was the first planned enterprise to aim directly Parthian heartland. In 54 BC Orodes finally captured and executed his brother, therefore ended the Parthian civil war (Bivar 1983, p. 49). Though at the same time, a bigger threat was drawing near.

Marcus Licinius Crassus was one of the most important figures of the Roman Late Republic.

Fig. 1: Marble portrait of Crassus from Louvre. Source: https://www.livius.org/pictures/a/roman-portraits/crassus/

He rose to prominence in Sulla’s civil war (83-81 BC) as one of Sulla’s best generals. He became possibly the wealthiest man in Rome due to the confiscations after the war (Plutarch, Crassus; 2, 2; 3). While he was chosen as praetor by the Senate against Spartacus’ rebellion, he raised his army with his own wealth. He defeated Spartacus’ army in the Battle of Silarius River and ended Third Servile War (71 BC). Later he became consul and censor, ultimately one of the three leading men in the First Triumvirate in 60 BC. 

In late 55 BC, Crassus was ready to take pro-consulship of Syria. Though he was one of the three de-facto rulers of the so-called republic, and possibly the wealthiest man in Rome, he was under the shadow of the other two. Pompey was already the most respected military genius of his time, and there were Caesar’s ongoing conquests in Gaul (Gallic Wars took place between 58-50 BC). Crassus was ageing – 60 years old in 55 BC – and he had a lack of military glory that Pompey and Caesar had experienced.

Therefore, in 54 BC Crassus arrived in Syria. His intentions were well known before his arrival to his post, since he left Italy with a big army, amounting to around 40.000 men. He had seven legions under his command, and 4000 more light infantry and 4000 cavalry forces according to Plutarch (Crassus, 20, 1). In the mid of 54 BC he started his offensive in Northern Mesopotamia, and Greek cities of the region quickly accepted Roman rule. Only the satrap Silaces with his insufficient force tried to resist, but heavily outnumbering Romans defeated him in front of the walls of Ichnae (Sampson 2008, p. 101).  Silaces himself was wounded and fled to Orodes’ court to inform the king (Sampson 2008, p. 101; Sheldon 2010, p. 31). At this point Mithradates’ resistance in Seleucia was going on, but instead of relieving the keen Roman ally, Crassus garrisoned the cities of the region and turned back to Syria for winter quarters. Dio and Plutarch accuse him in the same manner with unhurriedness, and giving Parthians the time they needed (Plutarch, Crassus, 17, 4 ; Dio Cassius, XL, 13, 4). After the first encounter, he could had felt that laurels of conquest were already given to him.

Crassus spent the winter of 54 BC with preparations. He raised extra funds by sacking the Great Temple of Jerusalem, also his son Publius came with a 1000 strong fresh cavalry contingent from Gaul (Sampson 2008, p. 102, 104; Sheldon 2010, p. 31). In the spring of 53 BC; he accepted the Parthian envoys sent by Orodes, who were asking the reasons of this baseless war, with a high level of attitude. He said that he will answer their questions in Seleucia. Their reply was also quite dramatic: “…whereupon the eldest of the envoys, Vagises, burst out laughing and said, pointing to the palm of his upturned hand: ‘O Crassus, hair will grow there before thou shalt see Seleucia.’” (Plutarch, Crassus, 18, 2). After this fruitless meeting, he accepted Artavasdes, King of Armenia who came to the Roman camp with 6000 cavalry. Artavasdes suggested that Crassus should go through the safer route of Armenian highlands, and added he will raise another 10.000 armoured cavalry and 30.000 infantry for their joint effort (Plutarch, Crassus, 19, 1; 2). The Roman turned down the offer. He would take the Mesopotamian route.

Crassus crossed the Euphrates from Zeugma, and took the eastern route rather than turning to the south for Seleucia.

Fig. 2: Mesopotamia, detail from a map. Bivar 1983, p. 25.

Plutarch and Dio keep criticising his decisions: Crassus didn’t listen his legate Cassius’ advice to take the river route into the Southern Mesopotamia, but took the word of a local Arab guide, Ariamnes (or Abgarus in Dio) which led Romans into the trap. Our sources are too biased about the whole campaign and all the time they describe Crassus as bad as possible. He was on the other hand not an incompetent old man. He had well enough wartime experience. This can also be understood as an attempt of downplay of Parthian martial prowess. It is very likely that Crassus could had been aware of the existence of a significant Parthian army in the region. Taking the southern route without dealing with that army could put Roman army’s left flank and rearguard into danger. 

So the Roman army took the eastern route and reached Carrhae plains near the Balissus (Belikh) River, a tributary of Euphrates. Scouts of the army warned Crassus that the Parthian army was near. Though his officers urged him to make the camp near the river, observe the enemy and attack only at daybreak, Crassus had decided to fight the battle. He first extended the battle line as much as possible with little depth, and cavalry at the two wings; this would prevent highly mobile Parthian army to encircle them. Suddenly after he changed his mind and called for a square formation protected by each side; “he changed his mind and concentrated his men, forming them in a hollow square of four fronts, with twelve cohorts on each side. With each cohort he placed a squadron of horse, that no part of the line might lack cavalry support, but that the whole body might advance to the attack with equal protection everywhere.” (Plutarch, Crassus, 23, 3; 4).

Now we must look at the Parthian side of the story. King Orodes was well aware of the dire situation of his realm faced. If two of his great enemies would unite their armies, that could be catastrophic for the Parthian Empire. Therefore after the civil war ended he split Parthian forces; the main army under his direct command to fight against Armenia, the second one was the personal army of so-called general Suren. Suren was his hereditary title from his noble family (House of Suren) and we do not know his personal name (Bivar 1983, p. 50-51). After the king, he was the most important person in the empire with great wealth (Sheldon 2010, p. 34). Plutarch describes him: “Nor was Surena an ordinary man at all, but in wealth, birth, and consideration, he stood next the king, while in valour and ability he was the foremost Parthian of his time, besides having no equal in stature and personal beauty.”. Suren’s entire force consisted of mounted men; a thousand of them heavy cavalry, the rest 9000 were horse-archers (Bivar 1983, p. 52). The clever supplement to this was his camel train, and was probably the most important tactical factor that brought the great victory. 

When Romans crossed the river, the Parthian army headed towards them. Suren concealed his main army behind his vanguard (heavy cavalry) making an impression that they were a smaller force than they were.

Fig. 3: Crassus’ army in square formation, Suren’s main force positioned in narrow order behind the vanguard to surprise the enemy.

He also made his heavy cavalry cover their armor with robes and skins. This scene suprised the Romans, and it seemed like they were encountering just a simple military force. When the Parthians reached close enough the Roman army, a signal came out and roars and drum sounds filled the air, and the cataphracts uncovered their armour (Bivar 1983, p. 53; Sheldon 2010, p. 36). First, heavy cavalry, personally led by Suren tried a frontal attack against legionaries, but after seeing that firmly packed shield wall was not penetrable, they changed the plan and retreated (Bivar 1983, p. 53). Then the slaughter begun, as horse archers encircled Romans from all sides and their higly effective arrows wreak havoc on Roman soldiers.

Fig. 4: Suren’s heavy cavalry tactically retreats, while horse archers surrounding and shooting the Romans. Camel train right behind the battle zone supplies them with new stocks of arrows every time they need.

If Roman soldiers were thinking these were just limited volleys, they were certainly wrong, because Suren’s supply train of 1000 camels had a great amount of reserve arrows to continue volley after volley for hours (see Fig. 4). 

Once Crassus realised the seriousness of the situation, he wanted to break the encirclement. He ordered his son Publius, who was the commander of one of the wings and under heavy pressure, to make a counter-attack. Soon after Publius’ charge, Parthian cavalry started a feigned retreat while shooting backwards with the famous Parthian shot. Young Crassus took the bait and chased them with his Gallic cavalry (best cavalry in the Roman army) right into the trap.

Fig. 5: Publius charges with his troops to break the encirclement, the Parthian horse archers lure him into trap.

He had 1300 cavalry, 500 archers, eight cohorts of foot soldiers, near 4000 men. All but 500 were slaughtered by the Parthian cataphracts (Bivar 1983, p. 54; Sheldon 2010, p. 37). A badly wounded Publius ordered his shield-bearer to kill him, many other commanders beside him took their own lives (Plutarch, Crassus, 25, 11; 12). Parthians put Publius’ head into a spear and displayed it in front of the Roman army, which was a devastating psychological blow. Though shattered in an awful situation, Roman soldiers were able to resist until the dusk. Then the Parthians withdrew and the Roman army, full of wounded and exhausted soldiers were looking for a sign of their commander. Understandably, Crassus was not the old Crassus anymore, he was lying in the dark with utter despair and not responding to his legates (Plutarch, Crassus, 27, 5). Octavius and Cassius took the command, their only solution was escape in the dark until the city of Carrhae. They left the dead and wounded behind, but as soon as they started to march, disorder showed itself; sometimes they changed course, sometimes they believed the enemy was after them and tried to get into battle formation (Plutarch, Crassus, 27, 6). Most of them (and of course Crassus) reached the city, but the Parthians killed the wounded and stragglers the next day. They also found legate Vargontinus and his 2000 soldiers who lost their way during the night march near a hill. All but 20 men died in this last skirmish (Plutarch, Crassus, 28, 2). 

Suren had no intention to let Crassus escape, so as soon as he realised they’re in Carrhae, he surrounded the Romans. Carrhae had not enough provisions for a prolonged siege, so Crassus made the decision for leaving the city at night. He went for a town near the Armenian foothills in the north, called Sinnaca. Another treacherous figure, local guide called Andromachus, misled the Romans and took them into bad roads. For Cassius all of that was enough and he left Crassus, took 500 horsemen with him back into Carrhae, and then to Syria (Bivar 1983, p. 55). On the other hand, Octavius and his men could reach into the town before the day. When the day broke, Crassus and his men were only 2 miles away from Sinnaca, Octavius and his men were clearly able to see them from the hilltop. When the Parthians attacked, Octavius and his men came to defend him. They were together near 7000 men (Sheldon 2010, p. 38). The Romans still had the opportunity to resist until dark and retreat back to the nearby and easily defendable town. Suren was aware of that, and he changed his approach; he said the king wants to make peace with Romans. He called Crassus to a meeting in order to discuss the terms. Crassus and a group of Roman soldiers, including Octavius and his lictors went to meet the Parthians. Plutarch rousingly describes the tragicomical end of this disastrous campaign:

“Then when Crassus proposed to send for a horse, Surena said there was no need of it, ‘for the king offers you this one.’ At the same time a horse with gold-studded bridle stood at Crassus’s side, and the grooms lifted Crassus up and mounted him, and then ran along by him, quickening his horse’s pace with blows. Octavius was first to seize the bridle, and after him Petronius, one of the legionary tribunes then the rest of the Romans in the party surrounded the horse, trying to stop him, and dragging away those who crowded in upon Crassus on either side. Scuffling followed, and a tumult, then blows. Octavius drew his sword and slew the groom of one of the Barbarians, but another smote Octavius down from behind. Petronius had no offensive weapons, but when he was struck on the breastplate, leaped down from his horse unwounded. Crassus was killed by a Parthian named Pomaxathres.”

The rest of the Roman soldiers in there were either killed or escaped back to the hilltop. The ones that still managed to survive, tried to escape again at night, but scattered without a leader, they were easy prey for their enemy. In conclusion; twenty thousand men had been killed and ten thousand taken prisoner, and many more spoils of war taken by the Parthians including the legionary eagles. The battle of Carrhae can preferably be determined as the worst disaster of Rome’s history. Crassus was one of the three de-facto rulers of Rome, his defeat at the battle and successive death completely changed the balance of power in Rome and paved the way for a series of civil wars that destroyed the republic.